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Let us start with what combined warfare is and how the notion evolved:
When used initially the doctrine of Combined-Arms (an evolution of the Deep Penetration Operational Level strategy/maneuver, based in part on the Soviet concept of Deep Battle, which was an innovative concept, based on reversing the lessons of world war 1 with modern technology that effectively altered the technological terrain ) was denoted as specifically the German bypassing of the French Maginot Line during World War 2. From what I understand the significance was it ended the days of Infantry-Intense "Balanced Doctrine" (ultimately a propaganda term used to designate a lack of unit cohesion at higher levels due to initially technological limitations, then due to traditionalist mind-sets, which were not wholly unprejudiced given the recent experience of World War 1, and the idiocies of over-used offense).
(Note - One issue I will raise is how people call Medieval and even Ancient Warfare "Combined Arms". They don't stop to think that if the term was that generally applied, it would be trivial and meaningless. If everyone's army is a combined-arms military (I cannot think of even a Roman or Spartan Legion which did not have at least some cavalry, and even an Agincourt the French with their knight-fanaticism brought men-at-arms and crossbowmen. ) I know there are a handful of cases of basically pure forces - but these often seem the exception, If that is all combined arms meant, I would say it is as trivial as critics of 4GW theory say their opponents are when they are merely "talking about guerilla warfare which has always existed as if it is something new." )
Back to the evolution of Combined Arms and when it was really first used:
Basically, it meant the Germans first sent their tanks, followed by mechanized infantry, followed by regular infantry, to take ground. This was preceded by intense aerial and artillery bombardment, which used pure air divisions capable of taking the initiative themselves, and not just to be used to support infantry or counter and aid artillery.
I am not sure if they used the initial tank surprise of World War 1 as an example, but it is certainly possible. This has to do with the British accidentally sending 3 tanks at the wrong time - that is, before the artillery fired to soften up the Germans. This complete surprise allowed the British to basically take a key, heavily reinforced German town with a mere three tanks, as the tanks were completely unexpected. The cause was an accident - a new time for the assault was scheduled, but for some reason three tank crews had not received the news and attacked at the earlier time, the time they had been told beforehand. Accident or not, It foreshadowed for the first time how this new invention would change the very face of war. I should note that the tank crews did, after realizing their mistake, try to turn around and go back through the town - however the infantry was this time prepared,, and took down one of the tanks while badly wounding the other two.
The lesson was clear - tanks taking infantry or an area by surprise could be nearly unstoppable save for some kind of miracle.
That is tanks that could be sent without support, at least on a tactical and/or operational level.
The French viewed tanks as primarily support for what had been, traditionally and from even recent and , hard-won, and bitter experience - logically - be considered the two decisive arms of war: Infantry and artillery.
The doctrine was thus to keep aircraft, infantry, tanks, artillery, etc together, and advance only in shallow thrusts. Basically the infantry would move first, after a heavy and prolonged artillery bombardment, and stop. The infantry would be followed by the tank, and aircraft would be used mostly to help the infantry and artillery achieve the decisive effect.
This can all be verified here: http://webapp1.dlib....ESEARCH/CMC.PDF
The German concept however was to let the tanks and mechanized infantry take the initiative. To make them mobile, and able to, as operational-scale units, basically go ahead of the other forces. Their advanced forces would be composed in a completely different manner then the follow up - with the first almost wholly tanks and mechanized infantry (again, with tanks advancing first followed by infantry which could prepare for, reinforce and assist) to hit deep behind enemy lines.
The division of forces like this allowed for wholly new maneuvers which would have been impossible in the past, and were "inconceivable" for almost everyone at the time.
Arguing that the tank would become decisive over infantry would seem almost a return to the idea of cavalry being decisive. Armored, fast moving units, a notion disregarded as far back as Machiavelli and linked to backwards ideas of wars based on professional armies and chivalry. The Napoleanic Wars, the American Civil War, and World War 1 all pointed to infantry being the decisive factor in war. Likewise artillery had proven to play a critical role. Mechanized infantry were almost entirely unproven. It is natural to see why a responsible person would be hesitant to throw away all that experience because of a "new toy" like the tank and mechanized infantry force. It also meant putting more confidence in technology then men.
Likewise it did not take into account the revolutionary nature of radio.
The Maginot line made use of it, but in general the French army lacked it.
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Indeed it was. France still relied on couriers to deliver vital information. Germany was the world's leader in mobile radio communications. Amazingly, the French commander in chief, Gen. Gamelin, did not even have a telephone in his HQ outside Paris.
https://www.lewrockw...f-world-war-ii/
This makes the use of pure operational units in co-ordination almost impossible. It also means that the traditional style of warfare was to be followed - that of mixing units up in enough balance, so they can deal with anything they encounter with effect and not possess some glaring Achilles'-heel.
The Germans by contrast were taking a series of risks - gambling on a new doctrine, gambling against experience, gambling for a series of new, untested technologies, and defying even common sense.
Radio, and the new use of far more mobile, specialized, and pure unit divisions was critical for this and is evidence of this:
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German tanks were equipped with radios which provided superior command and control against the Allies who did not equip their tanks with radios early in the war. Due to the poor French command and control, the German tanks were able to succeed dramatically despite being technologically inferior.
http://www.worldwar2...ar-2-tanks.html
We should also note that the German tanks were also outnumbered on the strategic scale.
This is what combined-arms thus meant: most literally, the arms were taken apart i.e. separated into large-scale cohesive wholes,and then re-combined in swift command and coordination.
This is very different then a balanced approach, where all units must work together and stay together (which is why the French doctrine was so slow - all units had to stay at the speed of the artillery and infantry. )
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The French High Command's tactical doctrine lagged far behind that of the Germans in connection with deployment of tanks. They view them as infantry support weapons, unlike their opposite numbers who view them as aggressive breakthrough instruments of war, but should be deployed en masse in divisions, to overpower the opposition.
http://tank-photogra...antry-tank.html
It could even be argued the French military was even better trained.
The Germans were out-trained, out-gunned, and out-classed at the start of World War 2. Despite this, they were able to use innovation and the initiative to secure a victory.
It was an irresponsible move in many respects on the German's part - treating war as an art. It could easily have gone badly, in which case the perpetrators of the stratagem would be seen as classic examples of Don Quixote style idiots.
This is more or less, when people started referring to "combined arms" as really coming into its own as a unique doctrine.
Note the part I am underlining. The tanks are not just deployed and mixed with infantry and artillery units - they are employed, en masse, by themselves. The mechanized-infantry are likewise. They do not have to move at the same speed, as the French do:
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Since infantry tanks were to work at the pace of infantry units which would be attacking on foot, high speed was not a requirement and they were able to carry heavier armour. The first two purpose-designed infantry tanks, the A.11 Matilda Mark I armed with a heavy machine-gun and A.12 Matilda Mark II with a heavy machine gun and 2-pounder anti-tank gun. The Mark I had been ordered in 1938, but it had become clear that a better-armed tank would be needed and the Mark II, was already under design and would be ordered in mid-1938.
https://en.wikipedia...i/Infantry_tank
That is because they are not keeping tanks and infantry together in one unit. Keeping tanks and infantry moving at the same pace makes sense if you have to keep them in one organizational unit, but if you have tanks that can go on their own - then you increase your possibilities for mobility and thus chance to seize the initiative by a magnitude.
And keep in mind tanks can, and go places even mechanized infantry cannot, and are not even close to as vulnerable on the initial charge. That is another reason to have pure tank divisions which can work as a relatively independent, cohesive whole, and make way for mechanized infantry to reinforce.
The Germans also established pure aerial divisions. Again from "A Clash of Military Cultures":
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Neither, however, had any understanding of aviation technology, and accordingly the French air weapon suffered from the senior commanders' neglect. Such German Army commanders as von Seeckt, Beck, von Blomberg and von Fritsch, on the other hand, demonstrated a strong interest in, and support of, military aviation.
http://webapp1.dlib....ESEARCH/CMC.PDF
This shows first hand the French were not emphasizing things like a group of bombers that could go deep, by themselves in to hit enemy targets. It showed a mix of units constantly moving and reinforcing each other, the planes are supposed to likewise stick by the infantry, tanks, artillery, etc. and not go off by themselves. This really limits their use, and it is no wonder expensive aerial forces were left to neglect.
(Note - this same source notes the lack of French mechanized divisions (again, mechanized forces were untested, and the French see infantry as the decisive arm.) It also makes sense if you want all your units mixed - in order to stay together, then they need to move at the same speed. You don't want your mechanized division going deep into enemy territory, not knowing where the tanks might be or if things changed, and then separated from the bulk of your infantry and artillery and aerial support. If disaster strikes or the enemy shifts movement, you have to wait for your couriers, which may even be intercepted. )
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The French also suffered from the lack of vision displayed by its commanders regarding motorization. To be sure, from the 1930s on,Gamelin placed a high priority upon the creation of motorized divisions, but his concept of motorization was essentially flawed.
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In the decade after World War I, French air doctrine developed little from the operations of 1918. Until 1933, the French air force was part of the army, and the army was primarily interested in reconnaissance, observation, close interdiction and air defense.
Again - everything kept as one group, no specialization. The air force is not a branch in itself, but merely part of the army. The army sees no need to develop such a specialized weapon.
The Germans by contrast heavily invested in aerial divisions, because they expected them to be able to take offensive, independent and highly mobile action as a cohesive whole by themselves, without relying on the protection of anti-air weapons and such for support.
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Like the army, the air force doctrine essentially outlined the creation of two air forces: one air force would be an army support force, flying short-range reconnaissance missions, observation missions, providing fighter defense for the army, and carrying out ground attacks. The second air force would be an independent air force serving under the strategic but not operational direction of the High Command. The independent air force had a strategic mission. The operational air force's strategic mission was not solely to bomb cities or industries deep in the enemy heartland-- although this was a possible mission. The German concept of strategic air war was based upon strategic effect. The independent air force, essentially a bomber force and a long-range force, would be directed toward those targets that would produce the most decisive effect.
Again a separate specialized organization - which gives them huge advantage in range, speed, flexibility and initiative. This flexibility is gained on the operational scale at the cost of tactical flexibility,
In summary, it is absurdly fashionable now at days to call all military doctrine that has ever existed "combined armies" and even to say that means "mixing units together". This is in fact the complete opposite of combined arms doctrine.
It really has nothing to do with the German opening move against the French in World War 2. Often times it sounds like the person just does not know what he or she is talking about.
To give an example:
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Combined arms is an approach to warfare which seeks to integrate different combat arms of a military to achieve mutually complementary effects (for example, using infantry and armor in an urban environment, where one supports the other, or both support each other).[1] According to strategist William S. Lind, combined arms can be distinguished from the concept of "supporting arms" as follows:
Combined arms hits the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously in such a manner that the actions he must take to defend himself from one make him more vulnerable to another. In contrast, supporting arms is hitting the enemy with two or more arms in sequence, or if simultaneously, then in such combination that the actions the enemy must take to defend himself from one also defends himself from the other(s).[2]
Though the lower-echelon units of a combined arms team may be of similar types, a balanced mixture of such units are combined into an effective higher-echelon unit, whether formally in a table of organization or informally in an ad hoc solution to a battlefield problem.
Combined arms hits the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously in such a manner that the actions he must take to defend himself from one make him more vulnerable to another. In contrast, supporting arms is hitting the enemy with two or more arms in sequence, or if simultaneously, then in such combination that the actions the enemy must take to defend himself from one also defends himself from the other(s).[2]
Though the lower-echelon units of a combined arms team may be of similar types, a balanced mixture of such units are combined into an effective higher-echelon unit, whether formally in a table of organization or informally in an ad hoc solution to a battlefield problem.
https://en.wikipedia...i/Combined_arms
Not only is the above pretty much wrong, it even contradicts itself. It is also exactly what the French were already doing at the start of the Second World War, so how this is to designate combined-arms as a distinct doctrine is unclear.
If the above is to be considered combined-arms.
If it just meant "mixing units types" that would very much apply to the French army, much more then the German. In which case we should say combined arms is idiotic.
In fact combined arms emphasized specialization up to the point of the army scale.
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Immediately after World War I, the German Army, led by Han von Seeckt as Chief of the General Staff, instituted a massive study of the lessons of World War I, and to develop new operational doctrine for the army and the air force. In the period of 1919-1921, five hundred German officers-- commanders, General Staff officers and technical experts -- were put to work on committees analyzing every aspect of the operations of the war, from mountain operations to tanks, to bombing operations, to fighter defense. By 1921, the five hundred officers, including 130 airmen, had completed their thorough study of the war's lessons, and out of this was distilled the German operational doctrine, Army Regulation 487, Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms. 69
Von Seeckt, who coordinated the post-war study of doctrine, took an entirely different position from the French military. Von Seeckt believed that maneuver, not firepower, was the dominant element in warfare, and that to execute maneuver, mobility was essential. Unlike the French, the Germans believed much more strongly in the offense. The Germans sought the means to get the armies out of the trenches and static battles, which were seen as ultimately to Germany's strategic disadvantage, and to win campaigns and decisions quickly, by maneuver and mobility. In contrast to the French, who affirmed the essential unity of the army 70 von Seeckt and the Reichswehr maintained a doctrine of warfare which essentially relied upon the establishment of two, different armies. One army would be an elite force, heavily armed with the latest weaponry and highly mobile. This army would be the offensive force, which would seek the decisive battle and out-maneuver its opponents. The second army would be primarily infantry, would not be as well-armed, and would primarily consist of reservists. This second army would act mainly in a defensive capacity. 71
Von Seeckt, who coordinated the post-war study of doctrine, took an entirely different position from the French military. Von Seeckt believed that maneuver, not firepower, was the dominant element in warfare, and that to execute maneuver, mobility was essential. Unlike the French, the Germans believed much more strongly in the offense. The Germans sought the means to get the armies out of the trenches and static battles, which were seen as ultimately to Germany's strategic disadvantage, and to win campaigns and decisions quickly, by maneuver and mobility. In contrast to the French, who affirmed the essential unity of the army 70 von Seeckt and the Reichswehr maintained a doctrine of warfare which essentially relied upon the establishment of two, different armies. One army would be an elite force, heavily armed with the latest weaponry and highly mobile. This army would be the offensive force, which would seek the decisive battle and out-maneuver its opponents. The second army would be primarily infantry, would not be as well-armed, and would primarily consist of reservists. This second army would act mainly in a defensive capacity. 71
So we can see combined-arms seems to have the following elements:
- It is mobility-intense.
-It is offensive based. (Note - This depends on if Defense in Depth is also considered combined arms, and I would say it is debatable depending on if the emphasis is using tanks, etc, to counter-attack and thus take ground - as this would effectively mount to two-different armies/divisions but used in reverse order. Overall, I would weigh this more as "combined-arms" on if the other factors are strongly present, and or/absent and whether the counter-attack can be considered offensive or defensive in nature and to what degree each. )
-It requires a high-level of communications between units.
-It is more centered on armor and/or aircraft then on infantry/slow forces. This derives from the mobility centered nature of it, which is a relative condition. Mostly it means forces can be sent forward to invade or destroy a part of the enemy before reinforcements arrive in terms of bulk attrition forces, which in World War 2 meant infantry and artillery. In essence, the combined-arms doctrine is purposely meant to counter the attrition doctrine.
-It allows for the army to split up, and some units to get ahead of other units, more or less operating independently in space if perhaps not entirely in time.
-That means independent, specialized and uniform units, capable of taking ground and operating rapidly, and independently at the operational level. This is key, because much of combined-arms consists of overwhelming the enemy tactically with operational maneuvers.
I cannot emphasize enough this last point. What makes this work is the ability to run 1,000 tanks into a line defended by 100 infantry before reinforcements can get there in time. This effectively allows Operational Formations to overwhelm units that may be tactically superior and do so with sufficient ease as to incur few casualties. That is what allows it to penetrate deep behind their lines, take the initiative, economize force and in summary: work.
In short, since you are able to move faster and concentrate numbers where you want and where they are not so concentrated - you effectively have an operational scale division facing a tactical scale division. This allows you to overwhelm the enemy in wave after wave where you choose. Last, I will say I do not necessarily think combined-arms is the right approach in all situations, the fact that the very nature of war changed so dramatically following World War 2 should be evidence of how the very basics of war could fundamentally change - from fire-power and offense intense (Napoleonic), to favoring defensive/heavily punishing offense (World War 1), and finally to mobility and offense intense (World War 2) . Even that lesson in itself can be called into question, as between the times of the American Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and up to the Civil War the rules were pretty consistent (less based on sieges, and more based on armies fighting to annihilate each other). I am just arguing against this notion of combined-arms being "mixed units." Combined-Arms is not just mixing units, it was actually the opposite.
Edited by PaintedWolf, 30 April 2017 - 07:50 PM.
